Abstract. The measurement of knowledge transfer is considered an important component of the overall performance assessment of research groups. It is, however, not a trivial task, because there is agreement on neither the definition nor on the logical structure of knowledge. In this paper the problems related to the explication of the title term are summarized and the relation between knowledge and information is critically discussed. Open questions with respect to the logical structure of knowledge and its transfer are identified. Requirements to the concept of a knowledge transferometer are developed. Finally the request to 5 scientests to measure their knowledge transfer is critically discussed.
Further problems arise when the knowledge bearer does not believe the new information or does not have the necessary prior knowledge to make any sense of the new information provided. All these problems suggest that the concept of 'knowledge' has a stronger link to the real world than 'information' in a sense that 'knowledge' seems to have a closer link to what is true in the real world, while 'information' is a more formal concept, existing more independently from the real world.
The situation becomes even more complicated by the fact that knowledge does not only exist on things existing in the 5 real world but also on formal constructs like theories, formal axioms, definitions or mathematical theorems. It has to my best knowledge
2 not yet been shown that this kind of knowledge can in any coherent manner be reduced to the concept of accumulation of information in a Shannon sense. We leave this issue open for future research and just reserve the term 'formal knowledge' for knowledge in this field. It is interesting that formal knowledge can thus be generated and multiplied without any experience from the 'real world', which seems to challenge Locke (1690) and his notion of non-existence of innate ideas. There 10 are at least three possible approaches to solve this conflict: One is to consider all formal knowledge as abstracted structures which (or the components of which) can be reduced to isomorphic structures in the real world. The second is to consider formal knowledge as a kind of attributes of human beings, who in themselves are, with their ideas and theories, etc, part of the world of things. The third is simply to extend the intended applicability of the term 'knowledge' to entities beyond the world of things.
A further major difference between the concepts of 'knowledge' and 'information', which has already been insinuated above
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but not discussed at any depth, is that knowledge is subjective while information is objective. Subjectivity is implied by one of the three Platonian necessary conditions, i.e. that knowledge can only be if it is believed by the knowledge bearer. This further implies that knowledge cannot exist without a knowledge holders. On the contrary, information is an objective quantity, which can be there (e.g. in a book, a newspaper, a hard-disk, or a traffic sign) even if it is not realized, appreciated, or believed by anybody (Ben-Naim, 2008) .
20
After meandering around these various aspects of the essence of 'knowledge' and still neglecting problems in what sense knowledge is an extensive quantity, we summarize:
-resorption of accessible true information increases knowledge.
-information which is not believed does not increase knowledge.
-information which is not understood does not increase knowledge.
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-the increase of formal knowledge, in which manner it may be achieved, also contributes to the increase of total knowledge.
-resorption of accessible des-information (i.e. false information) decreases knowledge.
-forgetting decreases knowledge.
-erroneous thinking can decrease the formal knowledge.
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2 The author admits to be guilty of circularity because of using one of the title-terms of the investigation also in his meta-language. The implied circularity, however, has no influence on the key results of this paper This list, without claiming to be exhaustive, summarizes the components of knowledge loss and gain identified so far. As a preliminary working definition, without claiming its final adequacy, we suggest "knowledge is the ability to assign justified truth values to statements." Each assignment of a truth-value is the answer to a binary question.
Is Knowledge an Extensive Quantity?
In a Platonian sense, knowledge certainly is not an extensive quantity, because it is not a quantity at all. Knowledge in the 5 Platonian sense characterizes the content, not the amount. In the context of measurement of knowledge transfer, as said above, not the content but the amount of knowledge is in the focus of the interest.
In the previous subsection, knowledge was tentatively explicated as the integral over the accessible (positive or negative 3 ) information. Prior to the clarification of some of the characteristics of the entity 'knowledge', this can only be understood in a metaphorical rather than verbatim way. One of the central questions is in what sense 'knowledge' is an extensive quantity.
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With Carnap (1995 Carnap ( /1966 we distinguish here between additive and non-additive extensive quantities.
First, the stronger condition, the additive extensiveness is discussed. With K being a knowledge function and a and b being two knowledge holders, then additive extensiveness would require (Carnap, 1995 (Carnap, /1966 :
( 1) which says that the knowledge both knowledge bearing persons have as a team is the sum of the knowledges (or whatever the 
Another counter-example is combination of overlapping, thus redundant, knowledge. Assume a password containing eight characters. Assume that two persons each know four of these characters. still under debate what knowledge actually is (Gettier, 1963) and how inadequate definitions of knowledge can be "degettiered", and having only a vague idea how the amount of knowledge can be quantified, it is not easily possible to accurately specify the extensiveness of knowledge (or more precisely: of the amount of knowledge). Given the task of measuring knowledge transfer, it seems justified to assume as a working hypothesis that the amount of knowledge transferred is an extensive (but not necessarily an additive) quantity. 
The Dimension of Knowledge
While 'information' is always related to a certain question or quantity, 'knowledge' is about everything the knowledge-bearer knows. Despite the inherent circularity in the above statement, it is obvious that knowledge exceeds information not only in a sense that it is the accumulated (i.e. integral) quantity rather than the incremental (i.e.. differential) quantity but also in a sense that it is associated with multiple rather than single questions or quantities. Admittedly the Shannon concept is also applicable 5 to multiple quantities by utilizing vector algebra. The gain of information is the difference of the entropy before the information is received and the entropy after the reception of knowledge. The entropy difference is scalar even for multidimensional states, thus the information is a scalar quantity. It suggests itself to treat knowledge transfer in a similar way. Each such transformation, however, requires a kind of norm or metric, whose definition implies its own problems.
Measurement of Knowledge
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Prima facie quantification of knowledge could be achieved just by counting the true statements the knowledge holder can make. This approach, however, leads immediately to absurdities, since the adequate weight of the statements this concept is based on cannot be assumed to be equal. Let person 1 know that all monkeys have a backbone. Let person 2 know that all mammals have a backbone. Who knows more? Thus, it is obvious that it is not only the number of true statements that counts but also the extension of each statement. We find that the measurement of knowledge in unities which somehow can be reduced 15 to single problems leads to major practical problems. Thus we put this issue aside and search for a more practical solution.
An Operational Definition of Knowledge?
Within empiricism and positivism (von Mises, 1939) it has been the standard approach to clarify problematic quantities using an operational definition (Bridgman, 1927) , i.e., the quantity is defined using a measurement instruction. Later this approach has been heavily criticized, e.g., by Suppe (1974) .
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In order to fairly characterize the semantic content of knowledge, its multi-dimensionality (i.e. consideration of knowledge on different things) has to be taken into account. The amount of knowledge, however, shall be a scalar quantity. The aspect of multi-dimensionality poses some problems on the operational definition of knowledge, and the metric mentioned in the previous section is an essential part of the definition of the measurement system. We put this issue aside for a moment and turn towards more practical considerations.
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Taking into account that knowledge is a characteristic of a person, namely the knowledge-bearer, it suggests itself that knowledge be measured by a quantitative analysis of how the test person fulfills certain tasks, namely specific tests. Crossword puzzles may be considered a candidate for such a test, more sophisticated tests certainly are available. The detailed specification of such tests are beyond the research field of philosophy of science or epistemology; it is considered to be a task for psychology instead. One problem, however, remains: Each test is limited to a certain field of knowledge, and the weights of the different 30 fields of knowledge among each other, as well as the weights between the different qualities of knowledge (reproductive knowledge, mental abilities, skill, workmanship, methodical knowledge) will always remain a subjective choice. person-dependent but also mood-dependent, health-dependent, depending on the time of the day, and others.
I am not aware of any test which is actually adequate to measure the total knowledge of a person. It seems not even clear how the total scientific knowledge of a person shall be defined. Thus I consider the approach to measure a person's knowledge as failed, at least for the moment.
Knowledge as Theoretical Quantity
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Problems identified in the previous sections to reduce knowledge to well-defined and measurable quantities like information suggest that it might be adequate to treat the term 'knowledge' as a 'theoretical term' in the sense of Carnap (1995 Carnap ( /1966 . Using
Ramsey-elimination (Ramsey, 1929) , any statement about 'knowledge' is reformulated as an existence statement of a quantity x which replaces the term 'knowledge' in all statements where it appears. According to J. Sneed (1979 Sneed ( /1971 , the existence of an unambiguous solution for x proves that the theory involving the theoretical term under assessment is an empirical theory.
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If there exist multiple solutions for the undefined term x, the theory is at least fulfillable or self-consistent. If it can be shown that no solution can be found for the undefined quantity x, then the theory is inconsistent and thus analytically false. While interesting in its own right, this concept does not help to provide a methodology to measure knowledge.
Transfer
In pre-theoretical terminology 'transfer' is a process where a transferendum is transferred to a destination of the transfer. A 25 paradigatic example is radiative transfer (Chandrasekhar, 1950) . It describes how much radiative energy in a certain frequency interval is received at a certain point in space along a certain line of sight, under consideration of emission, absorption and scattering along the line of sight. In the following it will be tried to apply similar concept to 'knowledge transfer'. Recent literature discusses means to achieve knowledge transfer and the benefit through knowledge transfer but falls short of establishing an adequate and universal quantification of knowledge transfer (Argote and Ingram, 2000; Kane et al., 2005) .
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following quasi-operational definition: One Kant is the gain of knowledge achieved by an average high school graduate after reeding the "Critique of Pure Reason". The reduction of this to SI units is left to more ambitous knowledge metrologists.
Calibration of the Knowledge Transferometer
The reference knowledge transferometer might not be adequate to measure knowledge transfer in all situations. Knowledge transferred by publication of a scientific journal article needs most likely to be measured by a different setup than knowledge 5 transferred by a soccer coach when he/she explains his/her strategy to the team. Thus different measurement setups go under the over-arching term knowledge transferometer. In order to make measurements with the various knowledge transferometers comparable, some calibration is needed. In other words, a rule must be defined how to find out how many milliKants or picoKants the amount of knowledge transferred and measured with one of these knowledge transferometers in arbitrary units actually is. The calibration procedure obviously depends strongly on the technical realization of the particular knowledge 10 transferometer under assessment. Thus detailing the calibration procedures of knowledge transferometry is beyond the scope of this paper.
Validation of the Knowledge Transferometer
Often, validation has been reduced to a comparison of measurements by different systems in oder to find out if these measurements agree within their error margin. The typical tool for this purpose is χ . If the probability that the discrepancy between the two sets of measurements is caused by a realization of the assumed combined measurement error distribution of the reference measurement and the measurement to be validated distribution is larger than 5%, then the differences are regarded as insignificant and the measurement is considered as validated.
Obviously the reference measurement used for validation has to be validated itself. If the quantity to be measured is defined in 20 a theoretical manner, the validation problem leads either to an infinite regress or a logical circle. That means, that we either need an infinite chain of validation processes, each involving another measurement system, or at one time one of the measurement systems to be validated is used as reference instrument. In contrast, we are fine off since we have defined knowledge transfer in an operational manner, and the validation chain has to be extended only down to the final element of the chain, viz., down to the knowledge transferometer used for the definition of the unit Kant is reached. 
Inversion of the Problem
Inspired by related literature (Adams, 1979) one might consider to attempt an inverse solution of the problem of the measurement of knowledge transfer. For this purpose it suggests itself to just assign a value to the knowledge transfer of the project under assessment. This value could be, e.g., fourty-two (in units of milliKant). The inversion part consists in the fact that some meaning has to be assigned to this number but this side aspect can be left to the science managers who requested the measure- ment of knowledge transfer. Some deeper thought reveals that this strategy is only adequate cum grano salis because it must be guaranteed that the measurement is not reported in Vogonian units.
Conclusion
Admittedly, the aim of this paper, to provide clarification with respect to the concepts and notions associated with knowledge transfer, has not been reached. It is, however, hoped that at least some awareness has been created about what the open questions 5 are and where the vagueness of this concept is hidden (or even obvious). Currently, the attempt to measure knowledge transfer seems to raise more questions than it answers. Clearly further research is needed within meta-scientific projects, which aim at answering the questions raised in this paper. Obviously these meta-scientific projects need evaluation themselves, including measurements of the transfer of the meta-knowledge gained (or meta-measurements of the knowledge gained, or even metameasurements of meta-knowledge gained). Unfortunately all three options seem to imply an infinite regress.
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Another problem is that knowledge about knowledge, and also the transfer of knowledge about knowledge transfer imply some self-reference, and the first order logic applied to most parts of this paper might no longer suffice. This leads us into the vicinity of the work of Tarski, Gödel, Lindström and others. These considerations, however, are beyond the scope of this paper.
This finger exercise on the claviature of knowledge metrology has not solved any of the problems related to the measurement of knowledge transfer, and it ends in an aporia, as did Theaitetos, Theodoros from Kyreme and Socrates (Plato, 369BC). In
